Live blog of opinions | June 26, 2019
We live-blogged as the Supreme Court released opinions in three argued cases: United States v. Haymond, Kisor v. Wilkie and Tennessee Wine & Spirits Retailers Association v. Thomas. SCOTUSblog is sponsored by Casetext: A more intelligent way to search the law.
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Here's the opinion in US v. Haymond. Amy Howe will have our analysis:
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Justice Alito begins his dissent with this zinger: "I do not think that there is a constitutional basis for today’s holding, which is set out in JUSTICE BREYER’s opinion, but it is narrow and has saved our jurisprudence from the consequences of the plurality opinion, which is not based on the original meaning of the Sixth Amendment, is irreconcilable with precedent, and sports rhetoric with potentially revolutionary implications. The plurality opinion appears to have been carefully crafted for the purpose of laying the groundwork for later decisions of much broader scope."To be fair, lot of the opinions this week seem to be intended to lay the groundwork for future cases.
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Gorsuch writes that only "a jury, acting on proof beyond a reasonable doubt, may take a person's liberty." But in this case, a federal law required a judge to send Haymond to prison without "empaneling a jury of his peers or requiring the government to prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. As applied here, we do not hesitate to hold that the statute violates the Fifth and Sixth Amendments."
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Justice Gorsuch notes, in responding to the dissent, that "what agitates the dissent so much is an issue not presented here: whether all supervised release proceedings comport with Apprendi." Justice Gorsuch states that the plurality opinion is limited to the specific statutory provision at issue.
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Here's the opinion in Kisor v. Wilkie. Amy Howe will have our analysis:
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"Whether to apply it depends on a range of considerations that we have noted now and again, but compile and further develop today. The deference doctrine we describe is potent in its place, but cabined in its scope." The court sends the case back to the court of appeals for it to consider whether it applies to the agency interpretation in this case.
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Interesting concurrence from the Chief Justice. He "write[s] separately to suggest that the distance between the majority and JUSTICE GORSUCH is not as great as it may initially appear" and explains that "the cases in which Auer deference is warranted largely overlap with the cases in which it would be unreasonable for a court not to be persuaded by an agency’s interpretation of its own regulation."
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Chief Roberts setting up a future Chevron showdown: "One further point: Issues surrounding judicial deference
to agency interpretations of their own regulations are
distinct from those raised in connection with judicial
deference to agency interpretations of statutes enacted by
Congress. See Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc., 467 U. S. 837 (1984). I do not regard the Court’s decision today to touch upon the latter
question." -
Here's the opinion in Tennessee Wine. Amy Howe will have our analysis (busy day!).
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In Kisor, the Chief Justice and Justice Kavanaugh each make this point: "Issues surrounding judicial deference to agency interpretations of their own regulations are distinct from those raised in connection with judicial deference to agency interpretations of statutes enacted by Congress. See Chevron..." And both note that they "do not regard the Court’s decision today to touch upon the latter question.
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The court holds that the state's two-year residency requirement for retail liquor licenses violates the Constitution's Commerce Clause, and is not saved by the 21st Amendment. The Commerce Clause bars states from discriminating against out-of-state residents, while the 21st Amendment gives states some latitude with respect to the regulation of alcohol.
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In Tennessee Wine, Justice Alito reaffirms the so-called "negative aspect of the Commerce Clause," also known as the dormant Commerce Clause - "But the proposition that the Commerce Clause by its own force restricts state protectionism is deeply rooted in our case law. And without the dormant Commerce Clause, we would be left with a constitutional scheme that those who framed and ratified the Constitution would surely find surprising."
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In footnote 4 of Justice Alito's opinion, he preserves the possibility that the Dormant Commerce Clause is not itself a good idea, and that the principle of non-protectionism should be rooted in other clauses. This maintains a tension with Justice Alito's own writing where he often votes for (and authors) cases depending on the dormant commerce clause, while also throwing shade on it for lacking any textual basis in the Constitution (see McBurney).
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In Tennessee Wine, Justice Gorsuch (joined by Justice Thomas) writes that the the 21st Amendment "embodied a classically federal compromise: Nationwide prohibition ended, but States gained broad discretion to calibrate alcohol regulations to local preferences," and that "under the terms of this compromise, Tennessee’s law imposing a two-year residency requirement on those who seek to sell liquor within its jurisdiction would seem perfectly permissible."
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Okay, I have three opinions to write about today, so I'm going to sign off. Nothing appears to have happened in the census case at the Supreme Court while I was on the live blog, but it's only 10:23, so there's still plenty of term. To recap, we got three decisions today: US v. Haymond, Tennessee Wine and Spirits v. Thomas, and Kisor v. Wilkie. We're waiting on five cases: Carpenter v. Murphy, the two partisan gerrymandering cases (Lamone v. Benisek & Rucho v. Common Cause), the census case (Department of Commerce v. NY), and Mitchell v. Wisconsin. I will put up a new summary of the remaining cases and try to read some new tea leaves later on today, but -- as several of you noted - it seems very likely that the Chief Justice is writing the partisan gerrymandering cases (which would not be a big surprise). Thanks so much for joining us, and hope to see you again tomorrow!
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In Kisor, Justice Kagan listed the following limits to Auer deference:(1) "a court should not afford Auer deference unless the regulation is genuinely ambiguous"(2) "before concluding that a rule is genuinely ambiguous, a court must exhaust all the 'traditional tools' of construction"(3) "If a genuine ambiguity remains, moreover, the agency's reading must still be 'reasonable'"(4) "a court must make an independent inquiry into whether the character and context of the agency interpretation entitles it to controlling weight"Justice Kagan then provides "some especially important markers" for when deference is appropriate. Given how frequently these deference questions come up in the DC and Federal Circuit, this sort of checklist will be very helpful.